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IN VARIANTS OF GO¨DEL’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Abstract
Three variants of Kurt Go¨del’s ontological argument, as proposed by Dana Scott,
C. Anthony Anderson and Melvin Fitting, are encoded and rigorously assessed
on the computer.
In contrast to Scott’s version of Go¨del’s argument, the two variants con-
tributed by Anderson and Fitting avoid modal collapse. Although they appear
quite different on a cursory reading, they are in fact closely related, as our
computer-supported formal analysis (conducted in the proof assistant system
Isabelle/HOL) reveals. Key to our formal analysis is the utilization of suitably
adapted notions of (modal) ultrafilters, and a careful distinction between exten-
sions and intensions of positive properties.
1. Introduction
The premises of Kurt Go¨del’s original variant of his modal ontological ar-
gument [20], as was found in his “Nachlass”, are inconsistent; this holds
already in base modal logic K [11, 9]. The premises of Scott’s [28] vari-
ant of Go¨del’s work, in contrast, are consistent [9, 11], but they imply the
modal collapse, ϕ→ 2ϕ, which has by many philosophers been considered
an undesirable side effect; cf. Sobel [30] and the references therein.1
In this article we formally encode and analyze, starting with Scott’s
variant, two prominent further emendations of Go¨del’s work both of which
successfully avoid modal collapse. These two variants have been con-
tributed by C. Anthony Anderson [1, 2] and Melvin Fitting [16], and on
1The modal collapse was already noted by Sobel [29, 30]. One might conclude from
it, that the premises of Go¨del’s argument imply that everything is determined, or alter-
natively, that there is no free will. Sre´cko Kovacsˇ [25] argues that modal collapse was
eventually intended by Go¨del.
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2a cursory reading they appear quite different. Our formal analysis, how-
ever, shows that, from a certain mathematical perspective, they are in fact
closely related.
Two notions are particularly important in our analysis. From set the-
ory, resp. topology, we borrow and suitably adapt, for use in our modal
logic context, the notion of ultrafilter and apply it in two different versions
to the set of positive properties. From the philosophy of language we adopt
the distinction between intensions and extensions of (positive) properties.
Such a distinction has been suggested already by Fitting in his textbook
“Types, Tableaus and Go¨del’s God” [16], which we take as a starting point
in our formalization work.
Utilizing these notions, and extending Fitting’s analysis, the modifica-
tions as introduced by Anderson and Fitting to Go¨del’s concept of positive
properties are formally studied and compared. Our computer-supported
analysis, which is carried out in the proof assistant system Isabelle/HOL
[27], is technically enabled by the universal logical reasoning approach [4],
which exploits shallow semantical embeddings (SSEs) of various logics of
interest—such as intensional higher-order modal logics (IHOML) in the
present article—in Church’s simple type theory [5], aka. classical higher-
order logic (HOL). This approach enables the reuse of existing, interactive
and automated, theorem proving technology for HOL to mechanize also
non-classical higher-order reasoning.
Some of the findings reported in this article have—at an abstract level—
already been summarized in the literature before [24, 6, 17], but they have
not been published in full detail yet (for example, the notions of “modal”
ultrafilters, as employed in our analysis, have not been made precise in
these papers). This is the contribution of this article.
In fact, we present and explain in detail the SSE of intensional higher-
order modal logic (IHOML) in HOL (§3.1), the encoding of different types
of modal filters and modal ultrafilters in HOL (§3.2), and finally the en-
coding and analysis of the three mentioned variants of Go¨del’s ontological
argument in HOL utilizing the SSE approach (§4, §5 and §6). We start
out (§2) with pointing to related prior work and with outlining the SSE
approach.
32. Prior Work and the SSE Approach
We briefly outline the key ideas of the shallow semantical embedding (SSE)
approach that is essential for the remainder of this article. This section is
intended to make the article sufficiently self-contained and to give references
to related prior work. The presentation in this section is taken and adapted
from a related article recently published [24, §1.1]; readers already familiar
with the SSE approach may simply skip it, and those who need further
details may consult further related articles [7, 4].
Earlier papers, cf. [4] and the references therein, focused on the de-
velopment of SSEs. These papers show that the standard translation
from propositional modal logic to first-order logic can be concisely mod-
eled (i.e., embedded) within higher-order theorem provers, so that the
modal operator 2, for example, can be explicitly defined by the λ-term
λϕ.λw.∀v.(Rwv → ϕv), where R denotes the accessibility relation asso-
ciated with 2. Then one can construct first-order formulas involving 2ϕ
and use them to represent and proof theorems. Thus, in an SSE, the tar-
get logic is internally represented using higher-order constructs in a proof
assistant system such as Isabelle/HOL. The first author, in collaboration
with Paulson [7], developed an SSE that captures quantified extensions
of modal logic (and other non-classical logics). For example, if ∀x.φx is
shorthand in HOL for Π(λx.φx), then 2∀xPx would be represented as
2Π′(λx.λw.Pxw), where Π′ stands for the λ-term λΦ.λw.Π(λx.Φxw), and
the 2 gets resolved as described above.
To see how these expressions can be resolved to produce the right rep-
resentation, consider the following series of reductions:
2∀xPx ≡ 2Π′(λx.λw.Pxw)
≡ 2((λΦ.λw.Π(λx.Φxw))(λx.λw.Pxw))
≡ 2(λw.Π(λx.(λx.λw.Pxw)xw))
≡ 2(λw.Π(λx.Pxw))
≡ (λϕ.λw.∀v.(Rwv → ϕv))(λw.Π(λx.Pxw))
≡ (λϕ.λw.Π(λv.Rwv → ϕv))(λw.Π(λx.Pxw))
≡ (λw.Π(λv.Rwv → (λw.Π(λx.Pxw))v))
≡ (λw.Π(λv.Rwv → Π(λx.Pxv)))
≡ (λw.∀v.Rwv → ∀x.Pxv)
≡ (λw.∀vx.Rwv → Pxv)
Thus, we end up with a representation of 2∀xPx in HOL. Of course, in this
setting types are assigned to each term of the language, which have been
4omitted above, but which will be given in the remainder of this article.
More precisely, in the SSE presented in Fig. 1, we will assign individual
terms (such as variable x above) the type e, and terms denoting worlds
(such as variable w above) the type i. From such base choices, all other
types in the above presentation can be inferred.
The SSE technique was also the starting point for a natural encod-
ing of Go¨del’s modern variant of the ontological argument in second-order
S5 modal logic. Various computer formalizations and assessments of re-
cent variants of the ontological argument in higher-order theorem provers
emerged from earlier work with colleagues and students. Initial studies [9]
investigated Go¨del’s and Scott’s variants of the argument within the higher-
order automated theorem prover (henceforth ATP) LEO-II [8]. Subsequent
work deepened these assessment studies [11, 12]. Instead of using LEO-II,
these studies utilized the higher-order proof assistant Isabelle/HOL, which
is interactive and which also supports strong proof automation. Some
of these experiments were reconstructed in the proof assistant Coq [10].
Additional follow-up work contributed a range of similar studies (see the
references in [24]) and includes a range of variants of the ontological ar-
gument proposed by other authors, such as Anderson, Ha´jek, Fitting, and
Lowe [1, 2, 21, 22, 23, 16, 26]; particularly relevant for this article is also
some prior work of the authors [18, 17]. The use of ultrafilters to study the
distinction between extensional and intensional positive properties in the
variants of Scott, Anderson and Fitting has first been mentioned in an in-
vited paper presented in 2018 at AISSQ conference in Bhubaneswar, India
[6], and subsequently at FMSPh-2019 conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia [3].
3. Further Preliminaries
The formal analysis in this article takes Fitting’s textbook [16] as a starting
point; see also the related prior work [18, 17]. Fitting suggests to carefully
distinguish between intensions and extensions of positive properties in the
context of Go¨del’s argument; and in order to do so within a single frame-
work he introduces a sufficiently expressive higher-order modal logic en-
hanced with means for the explicit representation of intensional terms and
their extensions, which we have termed in previous work [17] intensional
higher-order modal logic (IHOML). The SSE of IHOML in HOL, that we
utilize in the remainder of this article, is presented in §3.1. Notions of ul-
trafilters on sets of intensions, resp. extensions, of (positive) properties are
5then introduced in §3.2. Since we develop, explain and discuss our formal
encodings directly in Isabelle/HOL [27], some familiarity with this proof
assistant and its background logic HOL [5] is assumed.
3.1. Intensional Higher-Order Modal Logic in HOL
An encoding of IHOML in Isabelle/HOL utilizing the SSE approach, is
presented in Fig. 1. It starts in line 3 with the declaration of two base
types in HOL as mentioned before: type i stands for possible worlds and
type e for entities/individuals. To keep the encoding concise some type
synonyms are introduced in lines 4–7, which we explain next.
δ and σ abbreviate the types of predicates e⇒bool and i⇒bool, re-
spectively. Terms of type δ represent (extensional) properties of individ-
uals. Terms of type σ can be seen to represent world-lifted propositions,
i.e., truth-sets in Kripke’s modal relational semantics [19]. Note that the
explicit transition from modal propositions to terms (truth-sets) of type σ
is a key aspect in SSE approach; see the literature [4] for further details.
In the remainder of this article we make use of phrases such “world-lifted”
or “σ-type” terms to emphasize this conversion in the SSE approach.
τ , which abbreviates type i⇒i⇒bool, is accordingly the type of ac-
cessibility relations in modal relational semantics, and γ, which stands for
e⇒σ, is the type of world-lifted, intensional properties.
In lines 8–32 in Fig. 1 the modal logic connectives are introduced. For
example, in line 15 we find the definition of the world-lifted ∨-connective
(which is of type σ⇒σ⇒σ; type information is given here explicitly after the
::-token for ‘mor’, which is the ASCII-denominator for the infix-operator
∨ as introduced in parenthesis shortly after). ϕσ∨ψσ is defined as abbrevi-
ation for the truth-set λwi.ϕσwi ∨ ψσwi, respectively, ∨ is associated with
the lambda-term λϕσ.λψσ.λwi.ϕσwi∨ψσwi. In the remainder we generally
use bold-face symbols for world-lifted connectives (such as ∨) in order to
rigorously distinguish them from their ordinary counterparts (such as ∨)
in meta-logic HOL.
The world-lifted ¬-connective is introduced in line 11, ⊥ and> in lines
9–10, and respective further abbreviations for conjunction, implication and
equivalence are given in lines 14, 16 and 17, respectively. The operators⇁
and ⇁, introduced in lines 12 and 13, are inverting properties of types δ and
γ, respectively; these operations will occur in premises in the works of Scott,
Anderson and Fitting which govern the definition of positive properties.
6Fig. 1. Shallow semantical embedding of IHOML in HOL.
As we see in Fig. 1, types can often be omitted in Isabelle/HOL due
the system’s internal type inference mechanism. This feature is exploited
in our formalization to some extend to improve readability. However, for
all new abbreviations and definitions, we always explicitly declare the types
of the freshly introduced symbols; this not only supports a better intuitive
7understanding of these notions, it also reduces the amount of polymorphic
constructs in the formalization, which may cause a decreased practical
automation performance.
The world-lifted modal 2-operator and the (polymorphic)2 world-lifted
universal quantifier ∀, as already discussed in §2, are introduced in lines
31 and 19, respectively. In line 20, user-friendly binder-notation for ∀ is
additionally defined. In addition to the (polymorphic) possibilist quanti-
fiers, ∀ and ∃, defined this way in lines 19–22, further actualist quantifiers,
∀E and ∃E , are introduced in lines 24–28; their definition is guarded by an
explicit, possibly empty, existsAt predicate, which encodes whether an in-
dividual object actually “exists” at a particular given world, or not. These
additional actualist quantifiers are declared non-polymorphic, so that they
support quantification over individuals only. In the subsequent analysis of
the variants of Go¨del’s argument as contributed by Scott, Anderson and
Fitting, we will indeed apply ∀ and ∃ for different types in the type hier-
archy of HOL, while we need ∀E and ∃E for individuals only.
The notion of global validity of a world-lifted formula ψσ, denoted as
bψc, is introduced in line 34 as an abbreviation for ∀wi.ψw.
Note that an (intensional) base modal logic K is introduced in theory
IHOML. In later sections we will switch to logics KB and S5 by postulating
respective conditions (symmetry, and additionally reflexivity and transitiv-
ity) on the accessibility relation r.
In lines 35–46 some further abbreviations are declared, which address
the mediation between intensions and extensions of properties. World-lifted
propositions and intensional properties are modeled as terms of types σ
and γ respectively, i.e., they are technically handled in HOL as functions
over worlds whose extensions are obtained by applying them to a given
world w in context. The operation LϕM in line 37 is trivially converting
a world-independent proposition of Boolean type into a rigid world-lifted
proposition of type σ; the rigid world-lifted propositions obtained from this
trivial conversion have identical evaluations in all worlds.
The ↓-operator in line 40, which is of type (γ⇒σ)⇒γ⇒σ, is slightly
more involved. It evaluates its second argument, which is a property P of
type γ, for a given world w, and it then rigidly intensionalizes the obtained
extension of P in w. For technical reasons, however, ↓ is introduced as
a binary operator, with its first argument being a world-lifted predicate
2In line 19, ’a represents a type variable.
8ϕγ⇒σ that is being applied to the rigidly intensionalized ↓Pγ ; in fact, all
occurrences of the ↓-operator in our subsequent sections will have this
binary pattern.
The lemma statement in line 41 confirms that intensional properties Pγ
are generally different from their rigidly intensionalized counterparts ↓Pγ :
Isabelle/HOL’s model finder Nitpick [14] generates a countermodel to the
claim that they are (Leibniz-)equal.
A related (non-bold) binary operator ↓, of type (δ⇒σ)⇒γ⇒σ, is in-
troduced in line 44. Its first argument is a predicate ϕδ⇒σ applicable to
extensions of properties, and its second argument is an intensional prop-
erty. The ↓-operator evaluates its second argument Pγ in a given world w,
thereby obtaining an extension ↓Pγ of type δ, and then it applies its first ar-
gument ϕδ⇒σ to this extension. The ↓1-operator is analogous, but its first
argument ϕ is now of type δ⇒γ, which can be understood as world-lifted
binary predicate whose first argument is of type δ and its second argument
of type e. The ↓1-operator evaluates the intensional argument Pγ , given
to it in second position, in a given world w, and it then applies ϕδ⇒(e⇒σ)
to the result of this operation and subsequently to its (unmodified) second
argument ze.
In line 48, consistency of the introduced concepts is confirmed by the
model finder Nitpick [14]. Since we have introduced only abbreviations and
no axioms, the consistency of the Isabelle/HOL theory IHOML, as introduced
in Fig. 3.1, is actually evident.
3.2. Filters and Ultrafilters
Two related world-lifted notions of modal filters and modal ultrafilters are
defined in Fig. 2; for a general introduction to filters and ultrafilters we
refer to the corresponding mathematical literature (e.g. [15]).
δ-Ultrafilters are introduced in line 26 as world-lifted characteristic
functions of type (δ⇒σ)⇒σ. They thus denote σ-sets of σ-sets of objects
of type δ. In other words, a δ-Ultrafilter is a σ-subset of the σ-powerset of
δ-type property extensions.
A δ-Ultrafilter φ is defined as a δ-Filter satisfying an additional max-
imality condition: ∀ϕ.ϕ ∈δ φ ∨ (−1δϕ) ∈δ φ, where ∈δ is elementhood of
δ-type objects in σ-sets of δ-type objects (see line 4), and where −1δ is the
relative set complement operation on sets of entities (see line 14).
9Fig. 2. Definition of δ/γ-Filters and δ/γ-Ultrafilters.
The notion of δ-Filter is introduced in lines 17 and 18. A δ-Filter φ is
required to
• be large: Uδ ∈δ φ, where Uδ denotes the full set of δ-type objects
we start with (see line 8),
• exclude the empty set: ∅δ 6∈δ φ, where ∅δ is the world-lifted empty
set of δ-type objects (see line 6),
• be closed under supersets: ∀ϕψ.(ϕ ∈δ φ ∧ ϕ ⊆δ ψ)→ ψ ∈δ φ (the
world-lifted subset relation ⊆δ is defined in line 10), and
• be closed under intersections: ∀ϕψ.(ϕ ∈δ φ∧ψ ∈δ φ)→ (ϕuδψ) ⊆δ
φ (the intersection operation uδ is defined in line 12).
γ-Ultrafilters, which are of type (γ⇒σ)⇒σ, are analogously defined as
a σ-subset of the σ-powerset of γ-type property extensions.
The distinction of both notions of ultrafilters is needed in our subse-
quent investigation. This is because we will rigorously distinguish between
positive property intensions (as used by Scott and Anderson) and positive
property extensions (as utilized by Fitting).
10
Fig. 3. Scott’s variant of Go¨del’s argument, following Fitting.
By using polymorphic definitions, “duplications” of abbreviations in
theory ModalUltrafilter could actually be avoided. To support a more
precise understanding of δ- and γ-Ultrafilters, and their differences, how-
ever, we have decided to be very transparent and explicit regarding type
information in the provided definitions.
4. Scott’s Variant of Go¨del’s Argument
Scott’s variant of Go¨del’s argument has been reproduced by Fitting in his
textbook [16]. It is Fitting’s formalization of Scott’s variant that we have
encoded and verified first in our computer-supported analysis of positive
properties, ultrafilters and modal collapse. This encoding of Scott’s variant
is presented in Fig. 3 and its presentation is continued in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Ultrafilter-analysis of Scott’s variant (continued from Fig. 3).
First, some auxiliary definitions are introduced in lines 5–7. Then Part
I of the argument is reconstructed and verified with automated reasoning
tools.3 In this part we conclude from the premises and definitions (lines 4–
12) in theorem T3 that a Godlike being possibly exists (line 15): b3∃EGc;
this follows from theorems T1 and T2 that are proved in lines 13 and
14. Note that, using binder notation, b3∃EGc can be more intuitively
presented as b3∃Ex.Gxc. The most essential definition, the definition of
property G, which is of type γ and which defines a Godlike being xe to
possess all (intensional!) positive properties P, is given in line 9. Premises
that govern the notion of (intensional) positive properties P are A1 (which
is split into A1a and A1b), A2 and A3; see lines 13–15.
Part II of the argument is presented in lines 16–24. In line 17 we
3The automated reasoning tools that are integrated with Isabelle/HOL, and which
we utilize in this article, include metis, smt, simp, blast, force, and auto. In fact,
in each case where those occur in the presented Isabelle/HOL formalizations, we have
actually first used a generic hammer-tool, called sledgehammer [13], which calls state-
of-the-art ATPs to prove the statements in question fully automatically and without
the need for specifying the particularly required premises; sledgehammer, in case of
success, subsequently attempts to reconstruct the external proofs reported by the ATPs
in Isabelle/HOL’s trusted kernel by applying the mentioned automated reasoning tools.
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switch from base modal logic K to logic KB by postulating symmetry
of the accessibility relation r. Utilizing the same tools as before, and by
exploiting theorems T3, T4 and T5, we finally prove, in line 24, the main
theorem T6, which states that a Godlike being necessarily exists: b2∃EGc,
resp. b2∃Ex.Gxc.
Consistency of the Isabelle/HOL theory ScottVariant, as introduced
up to here, is confirmed by Nitpick in line 25 (which constructs a model
with one world and one entity—God)
In lines 27–33 modal collapse is proved. This is one of the rare cases
in our experiments where direct proof automation with Isabelle/HOL’s
integrated automated reasoning tools (incl. sledgehammer [13]) still fails.
A little interactive help is needed here to show that modal collapse indeed
follows from the premises in Scott’s variant of Go¨del’s argument.
For more background information and details on the formalization of
Scott’s argument, and also on the arguments by Anderson and Fitting as
presented in the following sections, we refer to Fitting’s textbook [16, §11].
4.1. Positive Properties and Ultrafilters: Scott
Interesting findings regarding positive properties and ultrafilters in Scott’s
variant are revealed in Fig. 4.
Theorem U1, which is proved in lines 36–41, states that the set of
positive properties P in Scott’s variant constitutes a γ-Ultrafilter.
In line 42, a modified notion of positive properties P ′ is defined as the
set of properties ϕ whose rigidly intensionalized extensions ↓ϕ are in P.
It is then shown in theorem U2 (lines 44–48), that also P ′ constitutes a
γ-Ultrafilter. And theorem U3 in line 49 shows that these two sets, P and
P ′, are in fact equal.
In line 51 we switch from logic KB to logic S5 by postulating reflexiv-
ity and transitivity of the accessibility relation r in addition to symmetry
(line 17 in Fig. 3); and we show consistency again (line 52). In the re-
maining lines 53–57 in Fig. 4 we show that the Barcan and the converse
Barcan formulas are valid for types e and γ; we use for the former type
actualist quantifiers (as in the argument) and for the latter type possibilist
quantifiers.
13
Fig. 5. Anderson’s variant of Go¨del’s argument, following Fitting.
5. Andersons’s Variant of Go¨del’s Argument
Anderson’s variant of Go¨del’s argument is presented in Fig. 5.
A central change in comparison to Scott’s variant concerns Scott’s
premises A1a and A1b. Anderson drops A1b and only keeps A1a: “If
a property is positive, then its negation is not positive”. This modifi-
cation, however, has the effect that the necessary existence of a Godlike
being, would no longer follow (and the reasoning tools in Isabelle/HOL
can confirm this; not shown here). Anderson’s variant therefore introduces
further emendations: it strengthens the notions of Godlikeness (in line 5)
14
and essence (in line 14). The emended notions, referred to by GA and EA,
are as follows:
GA An individual x is Godlike GA if and only if all and only the neces-
sary/essential properties of x are positive, i.e., GAx ≡ ∀Y (PY ↔
2(Y x)).
EA A property Y is an essence EA of an individual x if and only if all of
x’s necessary/essential properties are entailed by Y and (conversely)
all properties entailed by Y are necessary/essential properties of x.
As is shown in lines 3–19, no further modifications are required to ensure
that the intended theorem T6, the necessary existence of a GA-like being,
can (again) be proved.4
In line 20, the model finder Nitpick confirms that modal collapse is
indeed countersatisfiable in Anderson’s variant of Go¨del’s argument. As
expected, the reported countermodel consists of two worlds and one entity.
Consistency of theory AndersonVariant is confirmed by Nitpick in line
21; here only one world and one entity is needed.
5.1. Positive Properties and Ultrafilters: Anderson
Regarding positive properties and ultrafilters an interesting difference to
our prior observations for Scott’s version is revealed by the automated
reasoning tools: the set of positive properties P in Anderson’s variant does
not constitute a γ-Ultrafilter; Nitpick finds a countermodel to statement U1
in line 23 that consists of two worlds and one entity. However, the modified
notion P ′, i.e., the set of all properties ϕ, whose rigidly intensionalized
extensions are in P (line 24), still is a γ-Ultrafilter; see theorem U2, which
is proved in lines 25–30. Consequently, the sets P and P ′ are not generally
equal anymore and Nitpick reports a countermodel for statement U3 in line
31.
In lines 32–40, we once again switch from logic KB to logic S5, we
again show consistency, and we again analyze the Barcan and the converse
Barcan formulas for types e and γ. In contrast to before, the Barcan
and converse Barcan formulas for type e, when formulated with actualist
4In a very stringent interpretation this statement is not entirely true: Theorem T2 in
Scott’s argument, which was derived in Fig. 3 from axiom A3 and the definition of G, is
now directly postulated here (for simplicity reasons) and axiom A3, which had no other
purpose besides supporting T2, is dropped. This simplification, however, is obviously
independent from the aspects as discussed.
15
Fig. 6. Fitting’s variant of Go¨del’s argument.
quantifiers, are not valid anymore; Nitpick presents countermodels with
two worlds and two entities.
6. Fitting’s Variant of Go¨del’s Argument
In Fitting’s variant of Go¨del’s Argument, see Fig. 6, the notion of pos-
itive properties P in the definition of Godlikeness G ranges over exten-
sions of properties, i.e., over terms of type δ, and not over γ-type inten-
sional properties as in Scott’s and Anderson’s variants. In Fitting’s un-
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derstanding, positive properties are thus fixed from world to world, while
they are world-dependent in Scott’s and Anderson’s. In technical terms,
Scott (resp. Go¨del) defines G as the property λxe.∀Yγ .PY → Y x (line 9
in Fig. 3), whereas Fitting modifies this into λxe.∀Yδ.PY → LY xM (line
5 in Fig. 6). In an analogous way, the notion of essence is emended by
Fitting: while in Scott’s variant, see line 19 in Fig. 3, E Y x is defined as
(Yγx) ∧ (∀Zγ .Zx → Y V Z), it becomes LYδxM ∧ (∀Zδ.LZxM → Y V Z)
in Fitting’s variant (see line 15 in Fig. 6; also note in line 4 that V is now
defined on type δ and not on type γ as in Scott’s variant).
The definition of necessary existence NE in line 17 is adapted accord-
ingly, and in several other places of Fitting’s variant respective emendations
are required to suitably address his alternative interpretation of Go¨del’s no-
tion of positive properties (see, e.g., theorem T2 in line 9 or axiom A5 in
line 18). Fitting’s expressive logical system (IHOML) also allows us to dis-
tinguish between de dicto and de re readings of theorems T3, T5, and T6.
Except for the de dicto reading of T3, which has a countermodel with two
worlds and two entities, all of these statements are proved automatically
by the reasoning tools integrated with Isabelle/HOL.
As intended by Fitting, modal collapse is not provable anymore, which
can be seen in line 25, where Nitpick reports a countermodel with two
worlds and one entity.
Consistency of the Isabelle/HOL theory FittingVariant, as intro-
duced up to here, is confirmed by Nitpick in line 26 (one world, one entity).
6.1. Positive Properties and Ultrafilters: Fitting
The type of P has changed in Fitting’s variant from the prior γ ⇒ σ to
δ ⇒ σ. Hence, in our ultrafilter analysis, the notion of a γ-Ultrafilter
no longer applies and we must consult the corresponding notion of a δ-
Ultrafilter. Theorem U1, which is proved in lines 28–33 of Fig. 6, confirms
that Fitting’s emended notion of P indeed constitutes a δ-Ultrafilter.
In line 35 we again switch from modal logic KB to logic S5. Consis-
tency of the Isabelle/HOL theory FittingVariant in S5 is confirmed in
line 36, and countersatisfiability of modal collapse is reconfirmed in line 37.
Moreover, like for Anderson’s variant before, we get a countermodel
for the Barcan formula and the converse Barcan formula on type e, when
formulated with actualist quantifiers. The Barcan formula and its converse
are proved valid for type γ.
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7. Conclusion
Anderson and Fitting both succeed in altering Go¨del’s modal ontological
argument in such a way that the intended result, the necessary existence of
a Godlike being, is maintained while modal collapse is avoided. And both
solutions, from a cursory reading, are quite different.
We conclude by rephrasing in more precise, technical terms what has
been mentioned at abstract level already in the mentioned related arti-
cle [24, §2.3]:
In order to compare the argument variants by Scott, Anderson, and
Fitting, two notions of ultrafilters were formalized in Isabelle/HOL. A δ-
Ultrafilter, which is of type (δ⇒σ)⇒σ, is defined on the powerset of individ-
uals, i.e., on the set of rigid properties, and a γ-Ultrafilter, which is of type
(δ⇒σ)⇒σ, is defined on the powerset of concepts, i.e., on the set of non-
rigid, world-dependent properties. In our formalizations of the variants, a
careful distinction was made between the original notion of a positive prop-
erty P that applies to (intensional) properties and a restricted notion P ′
that applies to properties whose rigidified extensions are P-positive. Using
these definitions the following results were proved computationally:
• In Scott’s variant both P and P ′ coincide, and both are γ-Ultrafilters.
• In Anderson’s variant P and P ′ do not coincide, and only P ′, but not
P, is a γ-Ultrafilter.
• In Fitting’s variant, the P in the sense of Scott and Anderson is not
considered an appropriate notion. Fitting’s emended notion of posi-
tive properties P, however, which applies to extensions of properties,
corresponds to our definition of P ′ in Scott and Anderson. And,
as was to be expected, Fitting’s emended notion of P constitutes a
δ-Ultrafilter.
The presented computational experiments thus reveal an intriguing corre-
spondence between the variants of the ontological argument by Anderson
and Fitting, which otherwise seem quite different. The variants of Ander-
son and Fitting require that only the restricted notion of a positive property
is an ultrafilter.
The notion of positive properties in Go¨del’s ontological argument is
thus aligned with the mathematical notion of a (principal) modal ultrafil-
ter on intensional properties, and to avoid modal collapse it is sufficient to
restrict the modal ultrafilter-criterion to property extensions. In a sense,
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the notion of Godlike being “Gx” of Go¨del is thus in close correspondence
to the x-object in a principal modal ultrafilter “Fx” of positive proper-
ties. This appears interesting and relevant, since metaphysical existence
of a Godlike being is now linked to existence of an abstract object in a
mathematical theory.
Further research could look into a formal analysis of monotheism and
polytheism for the studied variants of Go¨del’s ontological argument. We
conjecture that different notions of equality will eventually support both
views, and a respective formal exploration study could take Kordula S´wie¸tor-
zecka’s related work [31] as a starting point.
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